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ABSTRACT
JORDAN, NINA Cognitive Dissonance as a Potential Mediator of the Misinformation Effect.
Department of Psychology, June 2011.
ADVISORS: Daniel Burns and Joshua Hart

The current study was interested in examining the relationship between cognitive
dissonance and susceptibility to misinformation. Participants were exposed to two
emotional images; subsequently, they composed a counterattitudinal essay concerned
with generating arguments in support of a tuition increase. Participants were either given
a set of objective questions concerning the images or a set of misleading questions. All
participants were then administered final questionnaires that contained both misleading
and non-leading questions. This study hypothesized that participants in the dissonanceinduced condition were likely to be more susceptible to the inclusion of misinformation
during the final recall task. Findings indicated that participants in the dissonance-induced
condition did not make more errors than those in the non-dissonance condition.
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Cognitive Dissonance as a Potential Mediator of the Misinformation Effect

Overview
The misinformation effect is a phenomenon that occurs when one’s
memory of an event is distorted as a result of one’s exposure to false post-event
information (Loftus, 1980). The misinformation effect occurs when an individual
experiences two competing and inconsistent cognitions: the memory of an event
and the misinformation, which is often supplied by an external source. An
explanation proposed here for the pervasiveness of misleading post-event
information is derived from the theory of cognitive dissonance. When applied to
the misinformation effect, this theory would suggest that in order to achieve
consonant cognitions the individual is likely to reconstruct a memory that makes
logical sense. The theoretical framework of cognitive dissonance may provide
insight into the reason that eyewitnesses to crimes are extremely susceptible to
integrating misinformation into their memories of an event. Police intervention
following a crime often affects retrieval process due to suggestive questioning.
Eyewitnesses tend to maintain strong beliefs in their testimonies, which is
problematic when their accounts are inaccurate reports of a given incident.
Eyewitness accounts are frequently distorted due to post-event influence from
other witnesses or as a result of suggestive questioning during police intervention.
This can be explained through the lens of cognitive dissonance; individuals may
believe that they saw one thing, but exposure to conflicting post-event
information might bring the original memory of the event into question. In order
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to logically make sense of the event, it is possible that individuals achieve
consonant cognitions by integrating the false post-event information into their
memory of the event.
The current study is interested in examining the relationship between
cognitive dissonance and susceptibility to misinformation. Participants were
exposed to two emotional images, one emotionally negative and one emotionally
positive in nature, for 30 s each. Subsequently, participants composed a
counterattitudinal essay concerned with producing arguments in support of a
yearly tuition increase. Those in the dissonance-induced condition were given the
choice to write against the increase, while those in the non-dissonance condition
were restricted to generating arguments in support of the increase. Following the
essay task, participants were either given a set of objective questions concerning
the images or they were given a set of questions that contained misleading
information. On a final recall task, all participants were given a final set of
questions concerning each image that contained a mix of misleading and nonleading questions. This study hypothesizes that the participants in the dissonanceinduced condition are likely to be more susceptible to the inclusion of
misinformation during the final recall task. In addition, it is anticipated that recall
of negative emotional images will be less accurate than recall of positive
emotional images. Previous studies that have been conducted on the
misinformation effect report that memory distortion is greater for negative
emotional events (e.g., Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003). Studies on cognitive
dissonance suggest that participants experiencing dissonance are more prone to
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make errors in recall on high load memory-tasks (Martinie, Olive, & Milland,
2010). This finding is relevant to the current study because the results imply that
cognitive dissonance induction may contribute to deficits in memory.
Descriptions of these studies are provided below and illustrate the importance of
studying the extent to which the misinformation effect and cognitive dissonance
are interconnected.
The Misinformation Effect
Memory distortion is extremely prevalent in cases in which one has been
exposed to reports that are inconsistent with one’s own perception of the event, a
lapse in accurate retrieval that is referred to as the misinformation effect (e.g.,
Roebers & McConkey, 2003). For example, in June of 2002, 110 prisoners,
including 11 men who had previously been on death row, were released from
prison due to DNA evidence that had surfaced, proving them innocent (Eakin,
Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall, 2003). They were initially sent to jail based on
reports from eyewitnesses, who had improperly recalled details of the criminal
incidents (Eakin et al., 2003). Eyewitnesses tend to be extremely susceptible to
the misinformation effect because they are often supplied with erroneous postevent information by co-witnesses or in the form of suggestive police questioning
(Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003). Suggestive questioning is often cited as a causal
factor in false allegations and false memories of a crime. This is particularly
problematic because police interviewers are not present during the event, yet they
are often responsible for exposing witnesses to misleading post-event information
(Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999). The pliability of memory has become a widely
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studied phenomenon because of the problematic social consequences of false or
distorted recall in the legal sphere. The misinformation effect has been replicated
across various conditions, yielding consistent results that have profound
implications concerning the reliability of memory. Although memory distortion is
extremely prevalent in eyewitness testimony, it is clear that misinformation
affects the accuracy of memory for other, more basic events as well. This
phenomenon occurs on a regular basis regardless of whether or not an event
produces arousal, which calls into question the general validity of memory.
There is evidence that susceptibility to misinformation varies as a function
of the time interval that elapses between encoding and recall, as well as the extent
of exposure to false information. Loftus (1992) claims that individuals are more
likely to misremember an event following exposure to post-event information if a
longer length of time has elapsed between the initial event and recall. She
attributes this increase in susceptibility to the discrepancy detection principle,
which holds, “recollections are more likely to change if a person does not
immediately detect discrepancies between post-event information and memory for
the original event” (Loftus, 1992, p. 121). The longer the delay between the
encoding process and recall, the more likely a person will fail to detect
discrepancies between misinformation and the original memory of the event.
However, studies indicate that the misinformation effect also occurs when little
time has elapsed between the event, misinformation, and retrieval period. In one
study, the experimental condition was exposed to slides of a man carrying a
screwdriver. Immediately following the image, misinformed participants read a
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narrative that stated that the man was carrying a wrench. In a control condition,
the slides depicted a screwdriver and the narrative stated that the man was
carrying a tool. Subsequently, participants in the two conditions were given a
memory test, which contained detailed questions about the original image.
Participants in the experimental condition gave inaccurate reports relative to the
control condition, which performed significantly better on the memory test (Eakin
& Screiber 2003). These findings are typical of misinformation studies, reiterating
that there are multiple factors that are responsible for memory distortion.
Although time plays a significant role in the extent to which one’s memory is
accurate, it is evident that exposure to misinformation is powerful enough to
distort one’s memory when there is little time between the encoding process,
misleading information, and recall.
Several studies have demonstrated that social factors also have a
significant effect on the accuracy of one’s retrieval following exposure to false
information (Itsukushima, Nishi, Maruyama, & Takahashi, 2006; Paterson, Kemp,
& Forgas, 2009). In an experiment conducted by Itsukushima et al. (2006),
researchers examined the extent to which social influence increases one’s
susceptibility to the misinformation effect. Participants were exposed to a series
of 16 slides that depicted a woman’s daily activities. Following the viewing of the
original information, misled participants were either asked to listen to a tape
recording of two people discussing the slides, or they were given a transcript of
the conversation between the two confederates. The researchers found a
significant difference between the two misled conditions and a control group that

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND THE MISINFORMATION EFFECT

6

was not exposed to misinformation. Interestingly, the researchers found that the
transcript of the conversation produced a more robust effect than the audiotape,
suggesting that text may have been more convincing because it appeared more
official and thus more reliable. Paterson et al. (2009) conducted a study in which
participants in one condition were instructed to discuss a video within a group that
contained a confederate. The confederate was responsible for introducing
inaccurate post-event information. Other conditions included no discussion, or
discussion in groups that did not contain a confederate. The findings demonstrated
that the confederate’s introjections had a profound effect on retrieval. Many of the
participants in the misled condition reported the inaccurate information that was
supplied by the confederate upon recall, a phenomenon referred to as the social
contagion of memory (Roediger, Meade, & Bergmen, 2001). Though it is clear
that social biases contribute to memory distortion, the effect is often replicated in
laboratory settings in which a person’s memory of an event is not subject to social
influence.
In the current study I am interested in determining whether or not the
tendency to misremember is, in part, a manifestation of cognitive dissonance.
Misremembering due to post-event information is related to dissonance because
integrating false information into memory requires a person to reconcile two
inconsistent representations of an event. However, the reason that the
misinformation effect occurs is heavily disputed because both cognitive processes
and social factors contribute to the occurrence of improper recall. Eakin et al.
(2003) cites four possible explanations for the misinformation effect, including
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retrieval blocking, response bias, demand factors, and source confusion. Retrieval
blocking is the relationship between the amount of misleading post-event
information and the extent of impairment of the original memory. Eakin et al.
(2003) hold that the more that one has been primed to associate the
misinformation and the original memory of the event, the more likely that one
will access misinformation at the time of recall. Response bias occurs when
individuals report false information at the time of retrieval due to the fact that they
did not encode the original details; rather, they encoded the misinformation
without being aware that they were misled. This factor is largely discredited
because of studies that indicate that participants who are told to anticipate
exposure to misleading post-event information are still somewhat susceptible to
the effect (Lindsay, 1990). Social demands occur when an individual does
accurately remember the original event but reports the misinformation in order to
provide a response that is consistent with the information that the researcher has
provided (Eakin et al. 2003). Source confusion occurs when participants recall
both the original content and the misinformation but cannot differentiate between
the two sources, rendering them susceptible to false recall (Eakin et al., 2003). All
of these explanations fail to consider that the misinformation effect might be a
result of two competing representations of an event that are logically
incompatible. Loftus (1990) explains, “an automobile that was involved in an
accident stopped at either a stop sign or a yield sign, but it did not stop at both…in
such instances, the most economical procedure may be to dismiss one memory in
favor of another” (49-50). In order to achieve a logical understanding of an event,
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it is possible that one rejects the original memory in order to achieve cognitive
consonance.
The current study is a partial replication of an experiment conducted by
Porter, Spencer, and Birt (2003). The findings of this study suggest that one’s
memory of negatively emotionally toned events is acutely susceptible to the
incorporation of major false details upon retrieval. In this study, participants were
exposed to either neutral, highly positive, or highly negative emotional images
selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS). Half of the
participants in each condition were exposed to misinformation in the form of a
questionnaire. For example, one of the images shows a man holding a woman up
to knifepoint in the foreground of the photograph. Misled participants were given
the following question: “on the grass in the background was an animal, was it a
cat or a dog?” These participants often reported seeing an animal in the
background of the photograph, despite the fact that the attack took place in an
empty alleyway. Overall, the control conditions significantly outperformed the
misled conditions regarding the number of accurate responses that they reported
at the time of recall. A second study conducted by Porter and his colleagues
followed a similar procedure, and replicated the finding that the incorporation of
misleading information into recall occurs more frequently for participants who
have been exposed to negative emotional imagery (Porter, Bellhouse, McDougall,
Brinke, & Wilson, 2010). In addition, participants were asked to return either one
week or one month following initial exposure to the images. The disparity in
recall across the misled condition and the non-misled condition was persistent,
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though recall was less accurate for all participants as more time elapsed. These
findings are significant in light of eyewitness reports because they indicate that
negative emotional arousal can cause an individual to be more susceptible to
misleading or suggestive post-event information. This is precisely the situation
likely to occur in criminal cases involving eyewitnesses.
Cognitive Dissonance
The theory of cognitive dissonance maintains that individuals experience
psychological discomfort when they hold contradictory beliefs or attitudes, or
when their beliefs or attitudes contradict their behaviors (Festinger, Riecken, &
Schachter, 1956). One will attempt to relieve this dissonance, or discomfort, by
adjusting one’s cognitions such that they are no longer discrepant (Festinger et
al.). Research into this phenomenon has revealed that the greater the discrepancy
between two cognitions, the greater the likelihood that a person will seek to
achieve consonant cognitions (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). The finding that
attitude changes occur as a result of dissonance manipulations has been replicated
in laboratory settings through various testing procedures. For example, an
experiment conducted by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), required participants to
engage in an extremely mundane task, which involved removing wooden spools
from a tray and replacing them in their previous location. Following this task,
participants were asked to remove square pegs from a tray, turn them clockwise,
and return them to their original location. The tasks were extremely tedious and
each was repeated for a full half an hour. The participants were separated into
three groups following the tasks; a control group was asked to leave, and the
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remaining two groups were offered financial compensation to explain to a
confederate that the task was extremely interesting. One of the remaining groups
was offered $20.00 to explain to the skeptical confederate that the task was
engaging, while the other group was offered $1.00. Following the conversation
with the confederate, the participants were asked to report how much they had
been entertained by the task. The researchers found that participants who were
offered $1.00 reported significantly more interest in the mundane task than those
who were offered $20.00. Presumably, those who were offered a sizable financial
incentive did not experience dissonance when asked to lie about their attitude
toward the task because the lie was justifiable. In contrast, the researchers
concluded that those who were only offered $1.00 felt compelled to change their
attitude toward the task in order to relieve the dissonance that they felt upon lying
to the confederate.
Martinie, Olive, and Milland (2010) induced cognitive dissonance by
employing a counterattitudinal essay manipulation. Fifty undergraduate students
were instructed to compose an essay in support of a tuition increase, which the
researchers previously determined was a topic that undergraduate students
opposed. Half of the participants were assigned to a no-dissonance condition, in
which they were forced to write in support of the increase. The other half of the
participants were assigned to a dissonance-inducing condition, in which they were
told that they should write in support of the increase, but they were given the
choice to write against the increase. The counterattitiudinal essay composition
exercise is a variation of the induced-compliance paradigm. This paradigm
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suggests that when there is no perceived choice in engaging in a behavior,
cognitive dissonance does not occur because the behavior is externally justified
(Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). The researchers found that the participants in the
dissonance-inducing condition favored the increase significantly more than those
in the no-dissonance condition. In addition to the counterattitudinal essay task,
participants were simultaneously given a secondary reaction time task, in which
they were asked to click on a computer mouse with their non-writing hand in
response to an auditory cue. Interestingly, participants in the dissonance-inducing
condition made significantly faster responses to the auditory signal than those in
the no-dissonance condition. The researchers attribute this difference to the idea
that inducing cognitive dissonance elicited arousal, which prompted a more rapid
reaction from the participants in the dissonance condition.
The current study is interested in looking at whether or not performing a
dissonance-inducing counterattitudinal essay task has an effect on recall accuracy.
A previous study, conducted by Martinie et al. (2010), was similarly concerned
with the potential impact of dissonance on short-term memory. The researchers
conducted a partial replication of the previously mentioned experiment by
supplementing a working memory task in place of the reaction time task. Eightyeight undergraduate students were separated into no-dissonance and dissonanceinducing conditions to perform the counterattitudinal essay task concerning a
tuition increase. The participants were simultaneously instructed to perform a
memory load task, which required them to memorize various three to five digit
numbers that were randomly generated using a computer program. The
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participants were exposed to the first set of numbers 5 s after beginning to write
the essay. At intervals of 20 to 30 s after exposure to the digits, participants were
asked to recall the series of digits by typing them into the computer program.
After recall, the participants received a new set of digits. Recall was considered
correct if the participants were able to identify each of the digits, regardless of
their order. This task was repeated throughout the 20-min essay composition
exercise. The researchers found that there was no significant difference between
the two conditions with respect to recall of the shorter string of three digit
numbers. However, participants in the no-dissonance condition were significantly
more accurate upon recall of the five digit sets of numbers than those in the
dissonance-inducing condition. The recall of five-digit sets of numbers is
considered high load on a memory-load task, whereas the recall of three-digit sets
of numbers is considered low load. The findings of this study indicate that
cognitive dissonance causes a depletion of working memory resources, which
accounts for the discrepancy in recall accuracy across the two conditions.
The Present Study
The current study is concerned with conducting a partial replication of the
research conducted by Porter et al. (2010). Participants were initially exposed to
two images, one negative and one positive, that were selected from the series of
images used in the study conducted by Porter et al.. All participants were then
given a counterattitudinal essay prompt in which they were asked to argue in
support of a yearly tuition increase, though half of the participants were given the
choice to generate arguments against the increase. The non-dissonance inducing
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condition was comprised of the participants who were forced to generate
arguments in support of the increase, while the dissonance-induced condition
included participants who were given the option to dissent. Following the essaytask, which simultaneously functioned as a distracter task, participants were given
a series of questions about each emotional image that were either misleading or
non-leading in nature. Following a second brief distracter task, all participants
were given a final set of fifteen questions for each picture, some of which were
misleading and some of which were non-leading. This study hypothesized that
participants in the dissonance-induced condition would be significantly more
susceptible to the misinformation effect than those in the non-dissonance inducing
condition. In accordance with the research conducted by Porter et al. (2010), it
was also expected that participants would experience less accurate recall for
negative emotional scenes than for positive emotional scenes.
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty undergraduate students from Union College volunteered
to participate in this experiment in exchange for $6 cash compensation or class
credit. Forty-one participants were male and seventy-nine were female. Each
participant was randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions.
These conditions included: no-dissonance, no misinformation; no-dissonance,
misinformation; dissonance-induced, no misinformation; or dissonance-induced,
misinformation. Participants were tested in groups of 10 or fewer. Within each
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session, participants were assigned to different between-subject conditions. There
were 30 participants assigned to each between-subjects condition.
Materials
Self-esteem scale.
The current study used the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, which is a 10
item Likert scale. Items are answered using a seven-point scale, where 1
corresponds to strong disagreement and 7 corresponds to strong agreement.
Images coded for positive and negative emotional valance.
Six of the ten emotional photographs that were selected from the International
Affective Picture System in the study conducted by Porter et al. (2010). Of the six
emotional images chosen for the current study, three negative and three positive,
each had been assigned ratings of emotional valance in the International Affective
Picture System manual. Each group of participants was only exposed to one
negative image and one positive image, which required separating the six images
into three pairings. The images were paired on the basis of their emotional
valance ratings. One image in each set was negative and one was positive. In
picture set one, image 9415 (“handicapped”) had an emotional valance rating of
4.91, while image 2340 (“man and kids”) had an emotional valance rating of 4.9.
In picture set two, image 6136 (“attacker and victim”) had a rating of 6.94; the
other image in the pair was 2345 (“beach”) and had a rating of 5.42. In picture set
three, image 9433 (“bleeding man”) was rated 5.89, while image 4617 (“café”)
was rated 5.19.
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Counterattitudinal Essay Task.
The counterattitudinal essay manipulation used in the current study was adapted
from a study conducted by Stalder and Baron (1998). The participants in the nondissonance inducing condition received the following no-choice essay prompt:
In this study, you have been randomly assigned to generate arguments
in favor of a moderate yearly tuition increase at Union College. Pilot
studies have indicated that students are not always comfortable
participating in this activity, but it is important for this research. We
usually like to let people write on either side of the issue, but we do
not have that option this time.
Participants in the dissonance-inducing condition received the following highchoice essay prompt:
In this study we would like to request that you generate arguments in
favor of a moderate yearly tuition increase at Union College. Pilot
studies have indicated that students are not always comfortable
participating in this activity, so we do not want to force you—in fact,
if you feel you must, you could generate arguments against the yearly
increase, but given the major focus of this research, it will be less
useful to us. So while we would like to stress that it is your choice
regarding which side of the issue to write on, our primary need is for
arguments in favor of the yearly increase.
Non-leading and misleading question sets.
The non-leading and misleading questions were identical to the question sets by
Porter et al. (2010). There was one initial question set that corresponded to each
emotional image. The non-misled condition received 10 non-leading questions
that objectively inquired about the content of the image. In contrast, the misled
condition received five questions that contained false post-event information as
well as five non-leading questions. For example, one non-leading question in
picture set 2 read, “what type of shirt was the attacker wearing in the
photograph?” The corresponding question in the mislead condition was “there
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was a sign on the door with the apartment number on it, did it say 104 or 135?”
The misled condition was led to believe that there was a number on the door
though the door lacked an apartment number. In a subsequent recall task, nonmisled and misled participants were given the same two sets of 15 questions that
corresponded to each of the two images. Each of these question sets contained
five misleading or suggestive questions and 10 objective questions.
Procedure
All participants were first asked to complete the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem
scale. Following completion of this task, participants were told that the purpose of
the current study was to examine the manner in which emotional scenes are
processed. Participants were exposed to one negative image for 30 s and one
positive image for 30 s, the order that the images were shown varied across
participants. Both images were flashed on a screen from an overhead projector.
Each of the three sets of pictures was presented to one third of the participants in
each of the four between-subjects conditions. The order of presentation of the
positive and negative images was completely counterbalanced. Half of the
participants in each between-subjects condition were exposed to the positive
image first, with the remaining 60 participants receiving the negative image first.
The counter-balancing scheme used in the current study is presented below:
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1
1
2
2
3
3
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Order
Pos-Neg
Neg-Pos
Pos-Neg
Neg-Pos
Pos-Neg
Neg-Pos

Following exposure to each image, participants were given 7 min to complete an
essay in support of a yearly tuition increase, which functioned as the cognitive
dissonance manipulation and a distracter task simultaneously. Following
completion of the counterattitudinal essay task, participants were given a series of
10 questions concerning the content of the first image to which they were
exposed, followed by a series of ten questions concerning the content of the
second image. After completing the question sets, participants were given a brief
distracter task. The task included a series of demographic questions and took
approximately 3 min to complete. All participants were then administered the
final question sets, each of which contained 10 non-leading questions and five
misleading questions concerning the first image. This was followed by a second
question set that contained ten non-leading questions and five misleading
questions that corresponded to the second image. Following this task, participants
were instructed to fill out a final brief questionnaire that contained a manipulation
check. The manipulation check was a 10 item Likert scale asking participants the
extent to which they support a yearly tuition increase at Union College, where 0
corresponded to strong disagreement and 10 corresponded to strong agreement.
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Finally, participants were debriefed and given the opportunity to ask any
questions they had about the study.
Results
A 2 (dissonance: dissonance-induced, non-dissonance induced) by 2
(misinformation: misled, non-misled) between-subjects ANOVA was performed
on tuition increase preference scores and showed a significant main effect of
dissonance, F(1, 116)=8.21, p<.05, but no main effect of misinformation F(1,
116)=.01, p>.05. The dissonance X misinformation interaction failed to reach
significance, F(1, 116)=.07, p>.05. This statistical analysis functioned as a
manipulation check to ensure that the counterattitudinal essay task elicited a
change in attitude toward a yearly tuition increase.
An initial 2 (dissonance: dissonance-induced, no-dissonance) by 2
(misinformation: misled, non-misled) by 2 (valence: positive, negative) mixed
factor ANOVA was conducted on recall accuracy scores for misleading questions
in question set two revealed that the main effect of dissonance was not significant,
F(1,116)=1.08, p >.05, nor did it interact with any other variable, (smallest
p=.26). These results suggest that cognitive dissonance had no effect on the
magnitude of the misinformation effect. Table 1 demonstrates that the dissonance
manipulation failed to have a significant effect on recall accuracy scores for both
positive and negative images.
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Table 1
Mean number of errors on second recall task by misled and non-misled
participants as a function of condition.
Condition
Valence

Dissonance-induced

Non-dissonance induced

Negative images

2.83
(1.65)

2.53
(1.77)

Positive images

3.13
(1.43)

3.10
(1.44)

Note. Parenthetical values are standard deviations.
Due to the fact that there were no significant effects of dissonance, it was
ignored in the following analyses. A 2 (misinformation: misled, non-misled) by 2
(valence: positive, negative) mixed factor ANOVA was conducted on recall
scores and revealed a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 118)=10.93, p<.05,
and a significant main effect of misinformation, F(1, 118)=1187.68, p<.05. The
valence X misinformation interaction also reached significance, F(1,118)=5.75,
p<.05. This interaction can be seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1

Since the interaction was significant, a paired-samples t-test was
performed on the number of errors with respect to image valance in the nonmisled condition and revealed that the positive images produced more errors than
the negative images, t(59)=4.17, p<.05. A second paired-samples t-test was
conducted on recall accuracy scores with respect to image valence in the misled
condition and demonstrated that there was no significant difference in recall
accuracy scores for negative and positive images, t(59)=.62, p>.05.
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A multiple regression analysis was conducted on recall accuracy scores for
misleading questions in the second positive question set. The regression analysis
used standardized self-esteem scores and a dummy variable for misinformation
condition (0 = no misinformation; 1 = misinformation) as predictor variables. The
analysis revealed, in addition to the aforementioned main effect of
misinformation, a marginally significant interaction between misinformation and
self-esteem, t(116) = -1.87, ß = -.14, p = .06. A probe of this interaction revealed
that the main effect of misinformation was stronger among individuals with lower
self-esteem; that is, low self-esteem was associated with greater susceptibility to
misinformation, at least for positive images (see Figure 2). However, it is
important to note that there was no parallel interaction for the accuracy scores in
the second negative question set.

Figure 2
Number of Errors for Misleading Questions in Question Set 2 As A Function Of
Self-Esteem and Condition
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Discussion
The results of this study did not support the hypothesis that the induction
of dissonance would affect the extent to which participants were susceptible to the
misinformation effect. Findings indicated that participants experiencing cognitive
dissonance did not have an increased susceptibility to the misinformation effect
with respect to a control condition. Additionally, the findings demonstrated that
non-misled and misled participants made fewer errors during the recall task
concerning negative emotional images than that concerning positive emotional
images. These results conflict with previous findings, a discrepancy that may be
attributable to the varying complexity of content within each image (Porter et al.
2003, Porter et al. 2010). The images used in the current study were paired based
on similarities in emotional valance, disregarding the content of each image.
Upon analysis, however, the positive images that were selected for this study
appear to contain more detail than the negative images. One reason that the
varying complexity of the images was problematic was that participants were only
exposed to each image for 30 s. As a result, participants had an extremely limited
amount of time to absorb the details of relatively complex visual stimuli.
Additionally, participants were not explicitly instructed to rehearse the details of
the images, which implies that most participants did not actively attempt to
remember the content to which they were briefly exposed. Loftus (1980) notes
that short-term memory cannot hold more than six or seven representations at the
same time. It was likely more difficult for participants to recall details of each
image, especially those of the more complex positive images, given that they were
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not informed that they would be given a short-term memory task. Without
rehearsal, representations that enter short-term memory are extremely malleable
and very difficult to accurately retrieve after a period of 30 s or longer (Peterson
& Peterson 1959). These factors may account for the slight discrepancy between
the amount of errors in recall for positive and negative images, given that the
positive images were more complex with respect to content.
In the current study, participants were given the dissonance manipulation
following exposure to the images. There was a 7 min period in which participants
were unconcerned with the content of the images, entirely focused on completing
the essay task. During this delay period, their mental representations of each
image presumably became acutely unreliable and, in most cases, extremely
susceptible to misinformation. Though there was no significant difference
between the recall accuracy of the misled participants in the dissonance-induced
condition and the non-dissonance induced condition, it is interesting to note that
some errors in recall were relatively consistent across all conditions. This finding
suggests that some of the common errors may have been a consequence of
pragmatic implication. Loftus (1980) explains:
a pragmatic implication is simply a remark that leads the hearer to
expect something neither explicitly stated nor necessarily logically
implied in the sentence. For example, the sentence ‘John pounded the
nail’ pragmatically implies that John was using a hammer. The
sentence says nothing about a hammer (pg. 151).
With regard to the current study, there were several specific instances in which
many participants, regardless of their respective conditions, were erroneous in
their recall responses. For example, the picture “Handicapped” depicted a man,
who was missing one leg, sitting in a wheelbarrow. A trend emerged which
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revealed that participants inaccurately recalled that the man was sitting in a
wheelchair, though it is clear that the device is a wheelbarrow. The fact that this
error was particularly common suggests that participants may have failed to
encode the original image well because a wheelbarrow is atypical in the context
of medicine. Another image, titled “café,” depicted a waiter talking to a woman
who was leaning against a car. He was holding an empty tray; however, he was
holding it in the air such that it appeared as if he were carrying food or beverages.
Many participants across various conditions erroneously assumed that he was
holding a beverage on the tray because he was positioned in such a manner that it
would be more logically viable for him to be carrying something. These trends
show that an individual’s expectations or preconceived notions have potentially
detrimental effects on memory, which is particularly problematic in eyewitness
reports.
It is possible that this study produced null results with regard to the
dissonance manipulation because false post-event information is so pervasive that
priming participants with cognitive dissonance did not affect the extent to which
they were susceptible to misinformation. Studies show that the misinformation
effect manifests differently when participants are warned about exposure to
misleading information; however, it is also evident that the effect remains
relatively persistent in such cases, demonstrating the pervasive nature of
misinformation. Echterhoff, Groll, and Hirst (2007) coined the phrase “tainted
truth” to describe a phenomenon that occurs when participants are forewarned
that they face potential exposure to misleading post-event information. Studies
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have indicated that participants have improperly recalled details of an event
despite the fact that they had previously been informed that a “co-witness” (a
confederate) may provide misleading or false post-event information (Echterhoff
et al. 2007). Echterhoff et al. (2007) argued that participants tended to
unintentionally overcompensate when attempting to identify misleading details by
assuming that the co-witness’ account was entirely erroneous. That is, when
participants have been told not to trust a co-witnesses account of an event, they
tended to believe both that the misleading information was false and that the
correct information that the co-witness provided was also false. Essentially,
participants in this condition continue to report false information upon recall due
to the fact that they are entirely untrusting of any information provided by the cowitness. This is a strange inversion of the misinformation effect, suggesting that
those who are aware that they might be exposed to misleading information are
significantly more likely to misremember the event than those in a control
condition. The misinformation effect is self-evidently powerful, which is clear
through studies like these that have attempted to prevent the effect from occurring
yet continuously fail to elicit accurate recall.
Memory distortion due to exposure to misinformation occurs frequently,
which suggests that few, if any, are exempt from susceptibility to the
misinformation effect under the right circumstances. The effect is extremely
robust with respect to other manifestations of memory distortion, including
susceptibility to implanted memories. Loftus (2004) illustrated the alarming
extent to which memory is fallible by demonstrating that it is possible to convince
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“suggestible” individuals that they have experienced an unusual fictitious event.
The results of her study showed that select individuals confused implanted
memories with actual ones, a finding that implies that some memories are wholly
unreliable (Loftus, 2004). The researcher conducted a study in which subjects
were exposed to an advertisement that referenced meeting Bugs bunny at
Disneyland, and “16% of those who had been exposed to the fake Bugs later said
that they had personally met Bugs Bunny at Disneyland” (Loftus, 2004, 146).
Loftus (2004) claims that certain subjects fabricated a detailed memory based on
the mere suggestion that the event had, in fact, occurred. A second study
conducted by Loftus (2004), demonstrated that it is possible to implant unpleasant
memories, as well as pleasant ones, in suggestible individuals. Participants were
led to believe that they had experienced having a nurse remove a skin sample
from their finger before the age of six. This study utilized the most powerful
mode of suggestion, which was requesting participants to actually visualize
themselves in the fictional scenario. The findings were consistent with those of
the previous study, in that approximately 16% of all participants were eager to
claim that they remembered the experience. The rate of people who are
susceptible to the misinformation effect is significantly higher than the rate of
individuals who are suggestible enough to claim ownership over implanted
memories, which implies that the misinformation effect is a typical yet extremely
powerful form of memory distortion. In the current study, participants who were
primed with dissonance were no more likely to misremember details of the
images as the non-dissonance induced condition, which suggests that the
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misinformation manipulation may have effectively overpowered the dissonance
manipulation.
There are several ways in which the current study could be modified in
order to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between
emotions, self-esteem, cognitive dissonance, and memory impairment. For
example, future research might further explore the relationship between emotion
and memory distortion by controlling for discrepancies in the content of negative
and positive emotional images. Perhaps the findings of the current study fail to
replicate previous findings because the negative and positive images were
significantly dissimilar with regard to detail, an issue that might be reconciled if
the images were matched based on both complexity of content and emotional
valance. The images used in the current study may have been inadequately
matched with respect to content, a problem that could be resolved in future
research by using inter-raters to compare the complexity of positive and negative
images. It is also important to note that future research should address the
potentially detrimental effect of low self-esteem on memory. A recent study
indicated that susceptibility to the misinformation effect is negatively correlated
with depression and fear of negative evaluation (Zhu et al., 2010). Conversely,
further analysis revealed that there were interaction effects between particular
personality traits and cognitive abilities that made certain individuals extremely
susceptible to the misinformation effect. For example, participants who exhibited
low fear of negative evaluation, high reward dependence, high self-directedness,
low cognitive abilities, low harm avoidance, and high reward dependence, were
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significantly more susceptible to the misinformation effect than those who
exhibited other combinations of personality traits and cognitive abilities (Zhu et
al., 2010). Although the difference was only marginally significant, the data that
were collected in the current study revealed a trend that suggests that there might
be a relationship between self-esteem and susceptibility to misinformation. In the
current study, participants who reported higher self-esteem tended to make fewer
errors during the recall task than those who reported lower self-esteem, a
correlation that should be further pursued in future research concerning emotional
disposition and memory.
Future research might also consider the misinformation effect in relation
to the modified theories of cognitive dissonance that have surfaced in the recent
past. Aronson (1999) argues that dissonance induction is significantly more
effective “when an important element of the self-concept is threatened” (110).
Other experiments have employed a counterattitudinal essay prompt. Stalder and
Baron (1998) misled participants into thinking that their peers would read and rate
their essays in which they had been asked to generate arguments in support of a
yearly tuition increase. The researchers informed participants that it would be
necessary for them to print their names at the end of their essays. This mildly
deceptive tactic was thought to elicit feelings of personal responsibility from
participants that would likely threaten their self-concepts. Future research might
consider the model of cognitive dissonance proposed by Aronson (1999) in
relation to memory distortion and the misinformation effect. In his modified
version of the widely studied theoretical framework, Aronson (1999) suggests that
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a cognitive dissonance manipulation is inadequate if it does not pose a threat to a
person’s sense of self. He holds that individuals will be unaffected by cognitive
dissonance if they do not perceive that there are any aversive consequences for
fostering conflicting beliefs, cognitions, or behaviors. It would be advantageous to
study the misinformation effect in conjunction with this modified theoretical
framework of dissonance that brings the self-concept into question, bringing up
issues of self-esteem. It is true that there are many cognitive and social influences
that have the potential to contaminate memories. However, it is important to
continue studying the extent to which these individual factors are detrimental to
memory. The study of the fallibility of memory is significant because memory
can be tainted through various avenues and distorted to different degrees.
Exploring the different factors that contribute to memory impairment is helpful in
revealing ways in which the potentially dangerous consequences of the
misinformation effect can be avoided.
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